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PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FOR 
REFUGEES IN SOUTH AFRICA AND 
THE POTENTIAL FOR STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE
JeFF HanDmaKer*
ABSTRACT
A decades-long social justice struggle that eventually displaced white minority rule in 
South Africa culminated in democratic elections in 1994. Following this historic transi-
tion from authoritarian rule to democracy, new issues came to the fore, including the 
rights of refugees and migrants. Civic actors in South Africa again became mobilised 
around this human rights and social justice issue through public interest litigation in the 
framework of South Africa’s bold, new Constitution. At different moments, civic actors 
confronted the government to fulfil its national and international obligations towards 
refugees. This article will briefly explain the emergence of new civic actors and issues 
in post-1994 democratic South Africa, and then elaborate three theoretical propositions 
on civic-state interactions to try and hold governments accountable to their human rights 
obligations. Next, these propositions will be applied to concrete examples where adminis-
trative law is tested in the domain of refugee law and policies. The article will conclude by 
briefly considering the extent to which public interest litigation in the area of refugee law 
and policies can inform the future prospects of public interest litigation in general.
i  introDuction
In the 1950s, civic society1 in South Africa became mobilised against racist 
laws that penetrated nearly every aspect of civic life. Public interest litigation 
became one of the more visible means to challenge these laws.2 Following 
South Africa’s historic transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, other 
issues came to the fore, including the rights of refugees and migrants, free-
dom of information and access to basic services. Although South Africa had 
a long history of migration, it only began formally admitting asylum seek-
* Lecturer in Law, Human Rights and Development at the International Institute of Social 
Studies, Erasmus University; Honorary Research Fellow at the School of Law, University of the 
Witwatersrand. The author formerly worked in various positions, including project coordinator on 
refugee rights from 1996 to 2000, for the organisation Lawyers for Human Rights in South Africa. 
Gratitude is extended to Jackie Dugard, Peter Alexander, Ebrahim Fakir, Karin Arts and two anony-
mous reviewers, for critical feedback on earlier drafts.
1 In this article, the term ‘civic society’ is preferred to the more common term ‘civil society’, reflect-
ing both the broad diversity of non-state perspectives, and an assumption that non-state actors need 
not always be ‘civil’.
2 As explained by RL Abel Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid 
1980–1994 (1995), lawyers were engaged in the 1980s and 1990s in challenging many laws that 
were the product of the then government’s apartheid policies that regulated many aspects of human 
behaviour on a racial basis, including the Group Areas Act (designating where one could live on 
the basis of race), the Immorality Act (which criminalised sexual interaction between races) and the 
Internal Security Act (which included various draconian provisions including the infamous s 29 or 
detention without trial).
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ers and recognising refugees in terms of internationally-recognised criteria 
from about 1994. The social justice challenges that refugees have faced in this 
period include access to asylum procedures, securing recognisable identifica-
tion documents and obtaining access to social services.3
Cooperative efforts by civic actors to persuade the government to respond 
to these social justice challenges often succeeded. However, growing numbers 
of asylum seekers from 1996 onwards, coupled with increasing animosity 
between civic actors and the government, meant that public interest litigation 
remained as the only option. Civic actors in South Africa were reconstituted 
into new structures and became mobilised around this ‘new’ human rights and 
social justice issue in the framework of South Africa’s bold, new Constitution. 
At different moments, therefore, civic actors became engaged either in working 
with government to develop a refugee policy, or in confronting the govern-
ment to fulfil its national and international obligations towards refugees.
This article, which draws on a broader study,4 discusses the dynamics of 
civic-state interactions aimed at the state’s obligations to promote, protect 
and fulfil human rights. Through the lens of refugee legal advocacy in South 
Africa, this article examines and explains the circumstances under which 
public interest litigation, as a form of confrontational civic-state interactions, 
can lead to structural change for refugees, and provides some reflections as 
to what these interactions can teach us about the potential of public interest 
litigation to realise rights in general.
(a)  Researching a personal experience
Similar to other researcher-practitioners,5 to a considerable extent, my 
research on civic-state interactions in South Africa from 1996 onwards has 
been a personal experience. As a lawyer working for the South African non-
governmental organisation (NGO) Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) from 
the early 1990s, I witnessed major legal changes and dramatic political shifts, 
but also a staggering social burden that the African National Congress (ANC)-
led South African government inherited when it came to power in 1994. No 
one working in such an environment could possibly claim to be neutral, and I 
was no exception. However, as any good lawyer ought to do, I always strove 
to develop arguments based on reliable, or at least objectively verifiable facts. 
I continued to work as a legal advocate, advisor and more recently lecturer in 
South Africa at different stages until the present day.
3 J Handmaker, L De la Hunt & J Klaaren (eds) Advancing Refugee Protection in South Africa 
(2008).
4 J Handmaker Advocating for Accountability: Civic-State Interactions to Protect Refugees in South 
Africa (2009).
5 MF Belvedere ‘Beyond xenophobia: Contested Identities and the Politics of Refugees in Post-
apartheid South Africa’ PHD dissertation, University of Minnesota (2006); J Dugard ‘Civil Action 
and Legal Mobilisation: The Phiri Water Meters Case’ in J Handmaker & R Berkhout (eds) 
Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa: Perspectives from Researchers and Practitioners (2010) 
73–99.
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My background as a practitioner has certainly shaped me as a researcher 
and I have sought to preserve the same ethical values and bring my own expe-
riences to researching the process of refugee policy development and practice 
in South Africa,6 interactions between civic actors and the government in 
different forms of social justice advocacy7 and other areas.8 Undertaking 
research related to my earlier, personal involvement in certain events posed 
certain challenges and opportunities.
As a participant in the early stages of the development of a refugee rights 
policy in South Africa, and later as a researcher, I had exceptional access to 
the actors involved in framing a refugee policy and associated documentation. 
While I was not directly involved in the three cases I examine in this article, 
I did follow developments closely and knew personally the lawyers who were 
handling these cases, and occasionally the lawyers on both sides. Hence, there 
was a generally high level of trust and access among those I interviewed in 
order to develop the picture of discussions on refugee rights policy in South 
Africa that began to emerge in earnest from 1996 onwards. Like Florencia 
Belvedere, I believe strongly that my personal engagement in these issues has 
been of tremendous benefit to this study. At least, I felt I was able to make 
more informed decisions about what aspects of refugee rights advocacy in 
South Africa were, in general, of greatest social relevance.9
The disadvantages of having been engaged in the subject of my study as a 
participant – in the early stages of refugee policy development and implementa-
tion – are also important to note. Just as neutrality is difficult, if not impossible 
for any practitioner, academic objectivity for a researcher is particularly dif-
ficult where one has participated in some of the events being reflected upon.10 
More specifically, there may be dual pressures on the researcher to take a 
position that is policy-relevant, while also meeting the very real needs of those 
who are the subject of the research.11 In short, while subjectivity may make 
one more sensitive to the topic being represented and the actors involved; 
inevitably it also leads one to make judgments.
Given this dilemma, I have avoided labelling the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrong-
ness’ of certain approaches, but have attempted to explain their consequences 
instead. I have also made it clear to those I have interviewed that it was not 
6 Handmaker et al (note 3 above); J Handmaker ‘No Easy Walk: Advancing Refugee Protection in 
South Africa’ (2001) 48(3) Africa Today 91; J Handmaker ‘Who Determines Policy? Promoting the 
Right of Asylum in South Africa’ (1999) 11 Int J of Refugee Law 290.
7 Handmaker & Berkhout (note 5 above); Handmaker (note 4 above).
8 J Handmaker ‘Beyond Exclusion: Assessing Palestinian Refugees’ Struggle for Protection and 
Recognition and their Potential Contribution to a Peace Settlement’ in K van der Borght (ed) 
Imagining a Shared Future: Perspectives on Law, Conflict and Economic Development in the 
Middle East (2011); J Handmaker ‘Responsibility to Protect When International Authorities Fail’, 
in S Asfaw, G Kerber & P Weiderud (eds) The Responsibility to Protect: Ethical and Theological 
Reflections (2005) 70–82.
9 Belvedere (note 5 above) 22–6. Belvedere acknowledged that she was similarly involved in events 
she later analysed in her PhD thesis.
10 B Cooke & U Kothari Participation: The New Tyranny? (2001).
11 K Jacobsen & LB Landau ‘The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research: Some Methodological and 
Ethical Considerations in Social Science Research on Forced Migration’ (2003) 27 Disasters 185.
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my principal intention to be policy-relevant, although I hoped that the findings 
and conclusions I made could be of use to practitioners. Furthermore, I have 
based my observations and conclusions on South Africa’s explicit normative 
commitments, as well as other written documentation, media reporting and 
semi-structured interviews.
(b)  Purposes of this article
With the overall objective to theorise the relationship between civic actors 
and the government in the context of public interest litigation on refugees’ 
rights, this article has four main sub-objectives. First, the article will briefly 
explain the emergence of new civic actors and issues in post-1994 democratic 
South Africa. Second, the article will elaborate three theoretical proposi-
tions, namely that civic actors possess capacity to hold states accountable, 
that structure matters in conditioning the possibilities for exercising civic 
agency and that civic actors mediate the relationship between global rules and 
locally-relevant expressions of those rules. These three theoretical proposi-
tions incorporate both socio-legal as well as structure-agency explanations, 
recognising that structure both shapes the conditions under which agency 
takes place, but can also change in ways that shape the possibilities for future 
civic-state interactions. Third, these propositions will be applied to concrete 
examples where administrative law is tested in the domain of refugee law and 
policies. Finally, the article will briefly consider the extent to which public 
interest litigation in the area of refugee law and policies can inform the future 
prospects of public interest litigation in general, and lead to structural changes 
in power relations.
ii  neW civic structures / neW issues
Civic structures that pursue social justice struggles in South Africa, and the 
new issues they confront, are essentially products of the late 1990s, although 
many of the strategies civic structures emulate were developed much earlier.12 
As Richard Ballard and colleagues have explained, these new structures and 
issues were primarily defined by trade union opposition to the government’s 
neo-liberal growth strategy,13 accompanied by spontaneous and eventually 
well-organised struggles against government failure to deliver basic services, 
including acts of direct resistance, civil disobedience or outright defiance of 
government policies.
According to Ballard et al14 the emergence of these new structures was 
mainly due to a dwindling of the South African liberation movement. This 
movement was widely regarded as the quintessential social movement of the 
12 Handmaker (note 4 above) 75–8, 82.
13 This is known as the government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy.
14 R Ballard, A Habib, I Valodia & E Zuern ‘Globalisation, Marginalization and Contemporary Social 
Movements in South Africa’ (2005) 104 African Affairs 615; R Ballard, A Habib & I Valodia (eds) 
Voices of Protest: Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2006).
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20th century and principally represented by the ANC, although the ANC 
was by no means the only contributor. Ballard and his colleagues argued that 
this dwindling of the liberation movement was the result of various factors. 
Absorption of civic actors, who had formerly worked for civic organisations 
and NGOs, into the post-1994 government, meant there was limited institu-
tional continuity. Furthermore, shifts from civic organisations to government 
led to profound changes in the political opportunity structure. This was 
accompanied by a growing trend of technocratic development. Despite the 
government’s dramatically increased spending on welfare programmes, ana-
lysts such as Patrick Bond have rued the professionalisation of government 
departments, which has seen welfarism routinely trumped by pro-growth 
strategies.15
Faced with a dwindling social movement, civic actors and government have 
been confronted with a range of issues they never previously dealt with to any 
serious degree, including access to government-provided basic services for 
all, access to HIV antiretroviral (ARV) drugs and refugees.16
Many major political, legal and institutional changes in the South Africa 
of the early 1990s – which also paved the way for a refugee policy – were the 
outcome of a political negotiations process. The Congress for a Democratic 
South Africa (CODESA), a broadly representative process including the then 
(recently unbanned) political movements, the nationalist-led government, and 
various representatives from civic organisations, was a principal vehicle for 
these negotiations. The agreements made during CODESA marked a major 
policy shift away from a colonial and authoritarian regime, based on ethnic 
divisions, to a democratic government established on the basis of universal 
franchise, accountability and social justice.17
This policy shift that ushered in South Africa’s many democratic dispen-
sations was therefore not only the product of formal negotiations between 
political movements and the white-minority government. It was the culmina-
tion of a long-fought political struggle involving multiple civic actors who 
had been mobilising for progressive change in an organised way, both within 
South Africa and at the international level, since at least the beginning of the 
20th century. Policy shifts and the extended participation by civic actors in the 
political struggle in South Africa framed the conditions for public interest liti-
gation, including efforts to protect the rights of refugees from the mid-1990s 
onwards. Human rights, and by extension refugee rights advocacy and litiga-
tion in South Africa have therefore been characterised not only by challenges 
to the existing legal normative framework, but by the pursuit of a strategy of 
‘correcting’ the normative framework through reference to administrative law 
and international law and in particular the human rights corpus.
15 Ibid; P Bond Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms (2006). 
16 Ibid.
17 Of course, this is hardly uncontested. H Marais South Africa: Limits to Change The Political 
Economy of Transition (2001); Hein Marais, among others, has argued that the South African soci-
ety, and especially its economy, has become dominated by powerful global corporations and the 
promotion of elite interests at the cost of the majority poor.
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iii  tHeoretical ProPositions
Civic interactions to advocate state accountability for protecting refugee rights 
can be explained through three theoretical propositions, which I elaborate on 
in greater depth elsewhere,18 but will explain briefly in this part of the article. 
First, civic actors have the capacity to hold states accountable to their national 
and international legal obligations. Second, a conscious recognition of mainly 
state-based structural boundaries by civic actors is important, as they both 
condition the possibilities for civic agency and – through interactions with 
them – permit structural elaboration. Third, civic actors fulfil a central role in 
the translation of international rules in municipal legal contexts.
(a)  Civic capacity to hold states accountable
The first theoretical proposition is that the capacity of civic actors to promote 
and, where possible, impose state accountability for meeting national and 
international legal obligations has been shaped by structural changes in 
relevant normative, global, regional and national legal frameworks, as well 
as by political developments. The context in which these developments have 
taken place is what Michael Ignatieff has termed a historically significant 
global human rights ‘revolution’, with juridical, advocacy and enforcement 
dimensions.19
In addition to the introduction of numerous human rights instruments at the 
international level, changes have also occurred within the domestic legal sys-
tems of states, both in the industrialised global North and the newly-liberated 
global South, especially following the end of the Cold War. States have ratified 
Optional Protocols to international human rights treaties, which have, in the 
case of some countries such as South Africa, rendered these treaties directly 
enforceable in a country’s national court system. These normative develop-
ments have been accompanied by a growing consciousness among civic 
actors, and especially lawyers, about the utility of drawing on international 
human rights obligations in domestic legal argumentation.
This human rights revolution, according to Ignatieff and others,20 has been 
groundbreaking for human rights advocates, as I have discussed elsewhere.21 
As participants in international legal process, individuals and civic organisa-
tions have played key roles, from the framing of juridical standards to human 
rights enforcement, which have shifted the relationship between civic actors 
and the state.22
18 Handmaker (note 4 above) 19–58.
19 M Ignatieff (ed) Whose Universal Values? The Crisis in Human Rights (1999); M Ignatieff & A 
Gutmann (eds) Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (2001).
20 Ignatieff 1999 (note 19 above) 10–1; see also J Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice (2003); T Risse, SC Ropp & K Sikkink The Power Of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change (1999); W Korey NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘A 
Curious Grapevine’ (1998).
21 Handmaker (note 4 above) 28–36; R Higgins (ed) Problems and Process: International Law and 
How We Use It (1994).
22 Ibid.
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Civic participation in national legal process, and particularly the ability of 
civic actors to invoke national law and legal institutions, has also shifted the 
civic-state relationship, though by no means replaced it.23 The state and its 
structural institutions are still of primary significance. Civic legal interactions 
have affirmed the capacity of the courts to hold government accountable for 
carrying out its human rights obligations, thus negotiating a ‘delicate balance’ 
between court-sanctioned interventions and government decision-making 
through a careful interpretation of ‘reasonableness’ in government decision-
making.24
(b)  Importance of structural boundaries
The second theoretical proposition is based on a materialist approach, namely 
that boundaries that define the structural relationship between civic actors 
and the state shift in very specific ways that must be respected by civic 
actors (exercising their agency) if they want to be strategic in their efforts 
to hold states accountable.25 This understanding of the relationship between 
structure and agency, elaborated by sociologist Margaret Archer26 as the 
‘morphogenetic approach’, is an ideal method for explaining the dynamics of 
public interest litigation in South Africa. Such an approach recognises that 
government structures, which condition civic agency (at least in part), are the 
products of specific historical events. Structures are not, however, immutable. 
They may be elaborated through interplay with agency, by way of civic-state 
interactions.
Public interest litigation represents a confrontational expression of civic 
agency that is, generally speaking, more limited in scope than cooperative 
interactions (such as advising a policy-making process), but potentially has 
great value in elaborating a state-created structure. There are three variants 
of confrontational civic agency that aim to enforce government compliance. 
The first variant is legal review through internal administrative mechanisms 
and through the courts. The second variant of confrontational civic agency 
involves various efforts, often in conjunction with the media, aimed at publicly 
shaming the government for a particular act or omission. The third variant is 
essentially an extension of public shaming: mass mobilisation – openly con-
fronting government through large-scale protest.
The specific forms of civic agency involved in public shaming and mass 
mobilisation include acts of civil disobedience, large-scale demonstrations, 
well-organised civic boycotts and other highly visible campaigns.
23 Handmaker (note 4 above) 36–41.
24 J Klaaren (ed) A Delicate Balance: The Place of the Judiciary in a Constitutional Democracy 
(2006); C Hoexter ‘Standards of Review of Administrative Action: Review for Reasonableness’ in 
Klaaren (2006) 63–4.
25 These boundaries include social, cultural and economic opportunities and inequalities, and in par-
ticular boundaries defined by race and class, although these are not comprehensively dealt with in 
this particular article.
26 MS Archer Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach (2003).
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State institutions (primarily the courts, but also government institutions) 
may for various reasons define structural limitations to the expression of civic 
agency, and even suppress civic actors, particularly if they are confrontational. 
For example, police may refuse permission for a picket line, demonstrators 
may be arrested, and media portrayals of such interactions may be subject 
to government censorship. However, government efforts to suppress civic 
interventions may themselves be subject to civic legal challenge, leaving the 
courts to have the final say.
In countries that tend to have greater respect for the rule of law and rela-
tively robust accountability mechanisms, such as South Africa, my research 
identified four principal structures – partly overlapping – that tend to condition 
confrontational forms of civic agency, including public interest litigation, to 
hold government accountable for realising its human rights obligations. These 
structures are the (1) administrative; and (2) legal structures responsible for 
administering a legal regime, such as the refugee legal regime; (3) democratic 
and constitutional monitoring structures; and (4) the structure of the media.
(c)  Civic actors as translators
The third theoretical proposition draws from a socio-legal approach that 
civic actors fulfil a crucial role in mediating the translation of international 
legal norms into local contexts. This does not mean that those who are unfa-
miliar with international law and institutions are not in a position to bring a 
claim against the government, but the consciousness of these translators has 
undoubtedly been a powerful force in reinforcing social justice claims, and 
in particular legal claims, especially from the 1980s onwards.27 In order to be 
effective translators, civic actors know, or ought to know, the complex social, 
economic and cultural circumstances in which rights become articulated and 
claimed. In other words, they must possess a ‘double consciousness’ of the 
content of international law and the circumstances in which it is enforced 
as well as the local/national context in which these international norms find 
expression.28
The social distance between a civic actor (for example, a public interest 
NGO) and the state (for example, a government department that is the object 
of public interest litigation) can narrow or widen at any particular moment and 
is not in and of itself an indication of effectiveness. However, consciousness 
of the degree of social distance that exists at any given moment can reveal the 
potential dangers as well as strategic opportunities for civic actors engaged 
in public interest litigation, on the basis of which a strategic assessment can 
be made of who and what issues to litigate against and above-all when to 
litigate (or not). To deepen this understanding of civic actors as translators 
and understand the underlying social and political underpinnings of public 
27 See Abel (note 2 above).
28 SE Merry ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ (2006) 108 
American Anthropologist 38; SE Merry Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating 
International Law into Local Justice (2006).
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interest litigation, I apply the concept of social distance, which is a dimension 
of legal pluralism.29 Social distance represents the degree of ‘externalisation’ 
between the law maker (state) and law recipient (civic actor), as represented 
by divergences in (1) meanings or assumptions; (2) the social and economic 
interests of all stakeholders; and (3) political positions that they each, respec-
tively hold.
These three theoretical propositions provide a basis for understanding the 
dynamics of public interest litigation or ‘litigating for accountability’, which 
in this article is confined to litigating the rights of refugees. In the next part 
of the article, efforts to obtain access to asylum procedures and access to 
employment are analysed.
iv  litigating For accountability to Protect reFugees
Litigating for accountability of the government to protect refugees has involved 
a combination of legal and non-legal measures. The legal, administrative and 
other structures against which lawyers, as civic agents, have brought public 
interest litigation cases have, as mentioned, been products of specific historical 
events. By the same token, the events that have taken place have also framed 
the possibilities for a particular kind of civic intervention.
Case studies in this article focus on civic efforts to hold the South African 
government accountable through the courts, as opposed to other types of 
civic-state interactions, including policy formation or implementation. Since 
refugee procedures were formerly introduced into South Africa in 1993, two 
issues have come to the fore as being of particular significance to protect-
ing the interests and rights of refugees, namely ensuring access to refugee 
status determination procedures and promoting access to economic and social 
rights, particularly the right to work.
(a)  Litigating access to status determination procedures
Refugee status determination procedures in South Africa initially arose from 
a policy regime that for decades was geared entirely towards exclusion of 
so-called ‘prohibited persons’ or persons without legal residential status.30 
As there was no provision for admittance on the basis of persecution or war, 
asylum seekers and refugees also fell into this prohibited persons category. 
Although concessions were made to admit refugees in the context of the old 
policy regime, it was not until the passing of a Refugees Act 130 of 1998, 
which came into force in April 2000, that asylum seekers had an explicit legal 
claim for protection.31
29 RL Kidder ‘Towards an Integrated Theory of Imposed Law’ in S Burman & BE Harrell-Bond (eds) 
The Imposition of Law (1979) 289–305.
30 This was the terminology used in the notorious South African Aliens Control Act 190 of 1991.
31 J Klaaren, J Handmaker & LA De la Hunt ‘Talking a New Talk: A Legislative History of the 
Refugees Act 130 of 1998’ in Handmaker et al (note 3 above) 47–60.
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However, faced with a rapidly increasing refugee case load as asylum seek-
ers throughout the African continent and especially in southern Africa became 
aware of South Africa as a safe destination, the Department of Home Affairs 
(DHA) was reluctant to implement the Refugees Act. Hence, the DHA sought 
ways to limit the number of asylum seekers reaching its borders, through 
various interdiction measures. One such measure was a crude interpretation 
of a ‘first country of asylum’ principle, which assumed that asylum seekers 
entering South Africa through a land border would have had an opportunity 
to claim asylum in another country and should return to that country to have 
their claims heard. This ‘principle’, commonly invoked by countries in the 
European Union that share a partially-harmonised asylum system, provides 
that one should not be permitted to claim asylum in one country if another 
country could potentially have offered that claimant protection.32 The policy 
measure that the government introduced essentially refused entry to the vast 
majority of asylum seekers at the land borders and was firmly challenged by 
South African NGOs, and notably by LHR, culminating in the case of LHR v 
Department of Home Affairs 2001.33
Having interacted with the South African government extensively in the 
formulation of the Refugees Act, trained officials and interacted with the DHA 
in many other respects, including on individual cases, LHR and other NGOs 
undertook great efforts to amicably resolve the matter of turning back asylum 
seekers at the border with the then director-general of Home Affairs Billy 
Masethla. LHR intervened through various departmental officials with whom 
it had a good working relationship. The department did not, however, respond 
positively to these efforts and the interaction turned from quiet appeals and 
diplomatic overtures to a media battle. The department publicly accused LHR 
lawyers of being ‘peacetime heroes’ while LHR criticised the government 
for violating its international obligations and stated protection commitments 
towards refugees. LHR meanwhile developed a good relationship with one 
daily newspaper in particular, Business Day.34
A formal legal claim was eventually also launched by LHR to judicially-
review the measure interdicting asylum seekers at the border on the grounds 
that it was an unlawful measure that was ultra vires the Refugees Act.35 The 
launching of a legal claim heightened the tensions with the DHA, leading to 
furious statements by Masethla that the ‘LHR would make a “fool” of itself in 
court’.36 Eventually, however, the director-general backed down after Minister 
of Home Affairs Buthelezi, from a different political party in the Government 
of National Unit publicly berated him. A short time afterwards, the policy 
32 See S Lavenex Safe Third Countries: Extending the EU Asylum and Immigration Policies to Central 
and Eastern Europe (1999). 
33 Unreported case no 10783/2001 (High Court of South Africa, Transvaal Provincial Division 
2001). 
34 Belvedere (note 5 above) 189–91.
35 Confirmed in an interview by the author with Jacob van Garderen in Pretoria, 1 March 2011, who 
filed the court papers (the matter was eventually settled out of court).
36 F Chothia ‘Heroes are Warned Over Asylum Challenge’ Business Day (24 April 2001).
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was set aside. While full causality was clearly impossible to measure with 
any certainty, Buthelezi made very clear in his statements to the press that the 
department was embarrassed by the measure.
Although the LHR case was never decided by the South African court, it 
is still an excellent example of public interest litigation that utilised a skil-
ful combination of legal and non-legal means to force a structural change in 
policy. In particular LHR combined its launching of a legal complaint with an 
intensive extra-legal campaign that was waged in the media. So what are the 
explanations for this structural change?
LHR had brought the legal action against the government by invoking 
South Africa’s international legal obligations, fully aware that the DHA’s 
interpretation of ‘safe third country’ was fundamentally flawed. LHR gath-
ered this knowledge through academic literature and policy statements, but 
also through interactions with the local office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and by attending meetings of the 
executive committee of UNHCR in Geneva. Having knowledge of the local 
situation, LHR was in a good position to translate its global knowledge into 
a solid legal argument. In terms of social distance, LHR and the DHA could 
not have been further apart in terms of their meanings, interests and political 
positions. Indeed the DHA and LHR were blatantly antagonistic to each other. 
The department, in particular had a vastly different interpretation of their 
international obligations in terms of reception at the border and an apparent 
desire to make initial entry into the country far more restrictive, all related 
to a broader political agenda to be publicly seen to be stemming the flow 
of asylum seekers entering the country. However, the latter category shifted 
once the minister became involved. So what led to this shift?
As mentioned, LHR not only constructed a robust legal argument; the 
organisation also interacted closely with the media structure, and particularly 
a sympathetic journalist at the influential Business Day. LHR was clearly 
aware that internal tensions existed within the DHA between the minister 
and the director-general and these tensions played a decisive role in forcing 
Masethla to capitulate. As Buthelezi confirmed in the media, South Africa’s 
international reputation was at stake as people were systematically being 
turned back at the border. In short, LHR recognised these structurally condi-
tioning factors and planned its strategy accordingly.37
A much more confrontational type of public interest litigation that emerged 
in the early 2000s, addressed the situation of asylum seekers who were entitled 
to enter the country, but had not gained physical access to the refugee recep-
tion offices (RROs), where their claims were actually processed.38 Lawyers 
were also concerned that asylum seekers and refugees be provided access for 
37 Ibid.
38 As more than one highly frustrated South African lawyer mentioned (in confidence) to me, the fact 
that lawyers had started with challenging the bureaucratic criteria for fair refugee status determina-
tion procedures in 1996 and ended up, several years later, merely challenging access to the offices, 
represented a ‘backward slide’ in the behaviour of the DHA towards refugees and asylum seekers in 
South Africa.
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the purposes of renewing or extending their residence permits. Coupled with 
this was the temporary closure of DHA’s office in Johannesburg – the largest 
RRO in the country – for a lengthy period in April 2005, and the introduction 
by officials in another RRO of a daily quota system that limited the physical 
number of applicants into the building. The end result was that thousands 
of asylum seekers were being denied access to the RROs, either to have 
their applications for refugee status considered or even to have their permits 
renewed. Without any proof of formal status, asylum seekers without permits 
were especially vulnerable to arrest and exploitation.39
Once again, after numerous, and ultimately unproductive exchanges 
between civic actors and the DHA, LHR launched court challenges in April 
and October 2005, insisting that the DHA improve its access to the RROs. 
Meanwhile, the Cape Town office of the Legal Resources Centre launched its 
own Court challenge with regard to similar policies in place at the RRO there, 
in the case of Kiliko v Minister of Home Affairs.40 The Kiliko case concerned 
a policy in terms of which DHA officials were ordered to process only 20 
asylum seeker permits per day. This meant that dozens, if not hundreds of 
would-be applicants were turned away on a daily basis.
The DHA offered to settle the LHR case in 8 May 2005, which LHR 
accepted; and the settlement was confirmed by a Court order. The May 
Court order had little effect in improving access. According to LHR attorney, 
Fritz Gaerdes, who issued a press release, the situation became even worse 
in June 2005, when the DHA permanently closed its Johannesburg office in 
Rosettenville, forcing asylum seekers and refugees to use other DHA offices, 
in particular the office in Pretoria:
the High Court ordered the Department of Home Affairs to prepare and file a plan to facilitate 
all asylum applications by newly arrived asylum seekers. This plan required the Department 
to outline clear steps that it intended taking to solve the problems that asylum seekers expe-
rienced to access the asylum procedures … Since June we have continually monitored the 
situation. What we saw was that the daily queues at the Pretoria refugee reception office 
were on average 250 persons long, whilst the Department on average only assisted 45 newly 
arrived asylum seekers daily. The longer queues were therefore not due to a greater influx of 
asylum seekers in South Africa but, in our observations, rather due to departmental inaction 
and inefficiency.41
The High Court issued a further order in the form of a structural interdict on 
11 November 2005, which among other matters required the DHA to employ 
the services of ‘an independent process engineer or other suitably qualified 
individual to investigate, assess and make recommendations to ensure that 
asylum seekers can immediately access the asylum application procedures’.42 
LHR expressed satisfaction with the judgment, and declared it would continue 
to monitor the situation.
39 Belvedere (note 5 above) 191–278.
40 2006 (4) SA 114 (C).
41 LHR ‘Court Orders the Department of Home Affairs to Take Steps to Make the Asylum Procedures 
More Accessible’ press release (2005). 
42 Ibid.
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Judgment in the Kiliko matter was finally delivered on 16 January 2006. The 
Court judged the conduct of the DHA to be inconsistent with the fundamental 
rights of illegal foreigners as embodied in the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996. Accordingly, the Court also ordered a comprehensive 
structural interdict requiring the DHA to report on its progress in improving 
access to the Cape Town refugee reception office.
(b)  Litigating the right to work for asylum seekers
Another type of claim taken up by public interest lawyers advocating for 
refugees in South Africa was to protect refugees and asylum seekers’ right 
to work and, by extension to challenge discriminatory practices against them 
vis-à-vis South African nationals. It should be noted that, while cases brought 
to challenge the government’s restrictions on access to asylum determina-
tion procedures were largely brought on the sole initiative of the legal NGOs, 
cases on socio-economic rights tended to involve greater coordination and/or 
consultation with refugee and migrants’ groups.
As mentioned, the 1998 Refugees Act only came into force through admin-
istrative regulations in April 2000, and included a prohibition for asylum 
seekers to work or study for the duration of the consideration of their applica-
tions, which according to the regulations was to last no more than six months. 
Inevitably, the procedure took longer for the vast majority of refugee appli-
cants and so asylum seekers were left with no option than to work illegally, 
since there were no provisions for government assistance and the aid provided 
by NGOs and churches was minimal. In other words, the right to work for 
asylum seekers was a matter of survival.
The case that public interest lawyers brought to challenge this regulatory 
prohibition was Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka in 2001.43 In the years 
leading up to this case, journalists of various newspapers in South Africa 
reported on the extremely difficult conditions that asylum seekers and refu-
gees faced in their daily struggles for survival.44 This was at least an indirect 
result of an intensive, multi-year training programme for journalists by the 
Roll Back xenophobia Campaign, which was very active in this period, fol-
lowing the launch of the Braamfontein Statement in 1998.45
The Supreme Court of Appeals (SCA) eventually decided the Watchenuka 
case. The SCA declared the policy denying asylum seekers the right to work 
and study to be unlawful on the grounds that it violated the conditions for 
having a dignified life. The Court ordered the DHA’s Standing Committee to 
consider the circumstances of each applicant when deciding on the prohibition 
on work and study, whether on a case-by-case basis or by formulating guide-
43 2004 (4) SA 326 (SCA).
44 ‘4,500 Illegal Held at the Borders’ The Citizen (14 February 1998) 16; ‘Illegal Rampages by Home 
Affairs’ Mail&Guardian (15 May 1998) 7; ‘Solving the Refugee Problems’ The Daily News (27 
April 1998) 6; ‘Spelling Relief for Rulani’s Refugees’ Cape Argus (14 April 1998) 5.
45 Roll Back xenophobia Campaign ‘Braamfontein Statement: Racism and xenophobia, A Violation 
of Human Rights’ (1998).
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lines to be applied by RROs. Since individual screening would have entailed 
impossible administrative burdens, the prohibition was set aside.
While ensuring the right of asylum seekers to work was a success, albeit 
after nearly four years of litigation, challenging discrimination in employment 
practices was far more challenging. This applied in particular to the security 
industry, which was one of the few sectors in which many asylum seekers 
could find employment. The security industry in South Africa is partially pri-
vatised. It is overseen by a public-private entity known as the Security Officers 
Board. The Board had ruled that formal security jobs should be reserved for 
citizens only, meaning that refugees and asylum seekers employed in these 
jobs were in contravention of the law, which led LHR, refugee-led organisa-
tions such as the Union of Refugee Women and other civic organisations to 
try and settle the matter amicably by urging the Board to voluntarily lift the 
prohibition against asylum seekers and refugees. These efforts failed and a 
case was brought by the Union of Refugee Women, a refugee-led organisa-
tion, in close collaboration with LHR.46
The media also became very interested in the matter. Pretoria News reported 
that ‘the Security Industry Act, which regulates the security industry does 
not unfairly discriminate against refugees and it is thus not in conflict with 
the Constitution’.47 Human rights lawyers representing the Union of Refugee 
Women, who brought the case against the Board, were frustrated to face a 
very experienced and noted human rights lawyer, Wim Trengove, as their 
opponent in Court. In explaining the Board’s position, which departed from 
the conventional position of legal advocates not to comment on their client’s 
cases, Trengove put forward his argument to the press:
that while the Act did favour citizens and permanent residents over non-citizens, it was not 
discriminatory. The mere fact that refugees had to comply with the Act did not mean they 
could not seek employment in other industries … The security service industry was highly 
sensitive … and extreme caution was required to ensure only trustworthy persons were per-
mitted to become members. There was thus a need for strict and proper control.48
The case eventually ended up in the Constitutional Court, and it is worth 
elaborating on the legal reasoning by the justices, who were split on the 
matter. The reasoning by Justice Sachs, which as in so many of his eloquent 
judgments tried to find a middle ground, made extensive reference to South 
Africa’s obligations in international law, the ‘significance’ of the Refugees 
Act, the ‘historical and social setting in which the rights and entitlements of 
refugees have to be determined’ and finally the ‘constitutionally-mandated 
obligation to counteract xenophobia’.49 Justice Sachs referred to South Africa’s 
traditional culture of hospitality; as well as the special reasons why refugees 
found themselves in the country being the consequence of ‘instability and 
46 The Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 (4) 
SA 395 (CC).
47 Z Venter ‘Security Industry Act Does Not Discriminate’ Pretoria News (27 May 2006) 3.
48 Ibid.
49 Union of Refugee Women (note 46 above) paras 133–44.
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bloodshed in their home countries (that had) rendered life there intolerable’.50 
However, ultimately Justice Sachs agreed with the leading judgment by Justice 
Kondile that the discriminatory measure was not unconstitutional since there 
was still the possibility of granting an exemption:
I see no reason why access to employment in the security industry by persons in their situ-
ation should not be permitted in relation to sectors such as these, where no high security 
interests are at stake. To bar them would be to discriminate against them unfairly. At the same 
time I would not regard it as unfair to keep them from guarding installations and persons 
where particularly high security considerations come into play.51
And so, the discriminatory measure remains, despite this somewhat contradic-
tory reasoning. Although in both the Security Officers Board and Watchenuka 
cases the social distance remained very wide in terms of the meanings, inter-
ests and political positions held by civic actors and the government, the results 
were very different. A high-level Court decided both cases, and international 
obligations were invoked to insist that the government fulfil its protection 
obligations to refugees in this crucial area. LHR lawyer Jacob van Garderen 
argued that the media structure in this case ‘may have been decisive’, project-
ing a view that, while it may be reasonable to permit asylum seekers the right 
to work, this right had its limits, particularly in the highly sensitive area of 
security.52 While at the time Watchenuka was being heard, civic actors were 
actively engaged in interacting with the media, by the time the case against 
the Security Officers Board was brought, there was very little, if any training 
of the media taking place, and the South African media was notorious for its 
sensationalist reporting of crime and security. In other words, there was less 
attention paid to the media structure in challenging discrimination within the 
security industry as there was at the time asylum seekers were merely insist-
ing on the right to work.
(c)  What kinds of structural changes took place?
In response to these and other examples of public interest litigation, often 
in combination with non-legal measures as well,53 various structural changes 
have taken place. Furthermore, in all cases mentioned here, public interest 
lawyers not only creatively displayed their capacity to hold the government 
accountable in a variety of different cases, these lawyers actively fulfilled the 
role of translators, ensuring that the government’s international obligations 
were an integral part of their legal argumentation.
Judgments were obtained, for example in the Watchenuka case, which 
ordered the government to change its regulatory prohibition against asylum 
50 Ibid paras 145–6.
51 Ibid para 147.
52 Interview by the author with Jacob van Garderen in Pretoria, 1 March 2011.
53 It should be noted that, while the media was a regular and effective non-legal measure utilised by 
lawyers’ groups such as LHR, broader advocacy campaigns during this period were limited and 
mostly low-key, generally confined to challenging xenophobia and promoting public awareness 
by projecting a positive image of asylum seekers and refugees as making contributions to South 
Africa.
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seekers being able to work. In other cases, judgments forced the government 
to take action, or to refrain from action. Cases have also been concluded by 
way of a consent order, whereby the government agrees to do (or not do) some-
thing, and the court formally confirms this.
A much more interesting type of judgment that has the potential to lead 
to structural change is the structural interdict, as ordered in Kiliko, which 
gave the government time to improve its behaviour and engaged civic actors, 
the court and government in a three-way relationship geared towards a last-
ing solution. In essence, while political positions and meanings may be very 
far apart, structural interdicts artificially narrow the social distance between 
civic actors and government through constructing a shared interest in a long-
term solution. Here, it is essential to have a clear appreciation of the structural 
constraints faced by the government in order convincingly to argue that the 
government do things differently.
A final note to make is that litigation can be very productive, albeit hardly 
decisive, when combined with a skilful media campaign.54 This was certainly 
the case when LHR challenged the DHA’s so-called ‘third country policy’, 
and was arguably also the case at the time the Watchenuka matter was heard.
v  conclusions – WHat Future ProsPects For Public interest 
litigation?
So what can be concluded from this evaluation of public interest litigation 
to protect the rights and interests of refugees in South Africa? Furthermore, 
what implications do these conclusions hold for other issues, and in other 
geographical contexts?
First, it is crucial for civic organisations and individuals engaged in pub-
lic interest litigation to not merely understand the law, but to appreciate the 
social, economic and political context in which interactions with the state 
take place; in other words, to make a socio-legal analysis. Consequently, a 
conscious appreciation of the social distance that always exists between civic 
actors and the government will reveal strategic challenges and opportunities 
throughout the course of public interest litigation. As the examples in this arti-
cle reveal, civic actors are most certainly active participants in international 
and national legal processes and skilfully combine litigation with other forms 
of civic mobilisation, including interactions with the media.
Second, structural boundaries that condition civic actors’ capacity to act 
(their agency) must be understood, and indeed critically assessed when mak-
ing strategic choices. This includes not only the legal, administrative and 
constitutional structures, but also – and possibly more crucially – the media 
structure that plays such an important role in shaping public opinion, and 
potentially the views of the judges themselves.
54 See also the analysis by Dugard in this special issue, in relation to the Mazibuko and Joseph 
claims.
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Third, materialist explanations of public interest litigation can also be 
productive. Lawyers need to adopt what Archer has termed ‘being human’; 
in other words, agency is not boundless and structure matters. Government-
prescribed structures shape, or at least condition, the possibilities for civic 
agency. The historically-specific conditions under which laws and policies 
were structured in the first place are, furthermore, deeply political. In addi-
tion, beyond the laws and the government agencies and courts interpreting 
these laws, there are other structural factors that potentially limit the scope for 
public interest litigation, not least the climate of public opinion that has held 
strong views regarding refugees and migrants.
This being said, expressions of civic agency that wield public interest litiga-
tion in order to try and hold states accountable do hold possibilities in what I 
have termed a narrow but significant space.55 The space is narrow in terms of 
it being heavily framed by state interests, but also significant in terms of the 
potential it can have for precipitating progressive structural changes.
Based on this analysis of public interest litigation to promote and protect 
refugee rights, it seems evident that more sophisticated explanations of the 
strategic calculation taken by civic actors are needed, as opposed to bland, 
donor-led, impact-oriented analyses that explain nothing of the context in 
which such cases were brought and even less about why such cases were 
brought in the first place.56 The supposed value of public interest litigation 
cannot be boiled down to an anecdotal list of ‘success factors’ that will be of 
little use to future litigation. In other words, it is crucial from a knowledge-
building perspective to make more critical evaluations of the opportunities 
and constraints faced in securing structural change through public interest 
litigation.
South Africa continues to provide inspiring examples of public interest 
litigation, and provides much empirical material to critically explain the 
dynamics of public interest litigation, and inform practitioners on the poten-
tial of litigation to deliver structural change. An ongoing struggle for social 
justice, through public interest litigation, which was forged in South Africa’s 
anti-apartheid struggle, is most certainly far from over. As researcher/prac-
titioner Dugard writes in the context of the Mazibuko case, which ultimately 
failed in the Constitutional Court:
judicial defeat has neither deterred the campaign nor discouraged further uptake of proactive 
litigation … the Mazibuko rights-based mobilisation has already indirectly impacted, and 
continues to impact, broader struggles in South Africa. The full extent of this impact can 
only be determined by future research.57
55 Handmaker (note 4 above) 211.
56 G Marcus & S Budlender ‘A Strategic Evaluation of Public Interest Litigation in South Africa’ 
<http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/learning/strategic-evaluation-public-interest-litigation-
south-africa>; see also R Berkhout & U Seela ‘Stretching a Human Rights Approach in Search of 
Social Justice’ (2011) 13 (1) Dev Issues 9–10.
57 Dugard (note 5 above) 95.
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